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A u'(IVI LIZED" USE OF UN !TEn STATES POHER 
JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK * 
Q: You've said that the election of Ronald Reagan means a 
dramatic reorientation of US foreign policy. How will 
this affect the style and substance of your approach to 
the UN? 
A: What I will do, insofar as I can, is put my voice, put my 
weight on the scales on the side of the reorientation of 
US fpreign policy. I think that it ought to be changed 
in many ways, and I will use whatever limited influence I 
have to help bring about those changes. 
Q: Can you be specific? 
A: Sure. I think that the most important change ought to be 
a change in the goals. I think that what ought to be the 
goal of US foreign policy is the pursuit of a civilized 
*Jeane J. Kirkpatrick is the new United States Ambassador to the 
United Nations. Previously, she taught at Georgetown University and has 
been a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. The follow-
ing interview was conducted by Inter Dependent Editor Frederic Eckhard in 
New York on March 12, 1981. It is reprinted with permission from the 
Inter Dependent, Volume 7, 112 (March 1981). The Inter Dependent is an 
international affairs publication which is published by a coalition of 
non-profit groups headed by the United Nations Association of the United 
States. 
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conception of the American national interest. And I 
think in recent years we have come to believe that the 
pursuit of the US national interest, however civilized, 
was not a morally acceptable purpose of foreign policy. 
The restoration of that as a centerpiece of our foreign 
policy is, in my opinion, the most important aspect of 
the reorientation that's required. 
Second, I believe that we need to be more realistic 
about the necessity of restoring American strength and, 
from time to time -- again, in civilized ways, in mea-
sured ways -- using American power. I think we've been 
trying to run a foreign policy without power, without any 
kind of power except moral strength, and I think that's 
very unrealistic and that it doesn't work very well. It 
doesn't protect our moral goals, and doesn't protect the 
freedom of other people and doesn't protect the self-
determination by the people very well. 
Q: But you see morality as an important component ... 
A: Of course I do. 
Q: ... but balanced by power? 
A: No. I think in politics, as in life as a matter of fact, 
that power is a necessary aspect of the pur sui t and 
protection of moral goals and principles. It's like when 
you've got the pI ayground bully picking on the Ii ttle 
kid. You can appeal to his conscience and he goes on 
picking on the Ii ttle kid, and then you may eventually 
have to move in with some force and move him out. There 
you've got a very clear-cut example of the use of power --
not necessarily violence, by the way, but power to 
achieve a moral goal. And I think the same sort of thing 
is true with foreign policy. 
Q: In your American Legion speech you talked about a new 
consensus among the American public, a desire to see the 
strength and influence of the united States restored ... 
A: And self respect. 
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Q: How would you rate US influence in the United Nations and 
what might you do to increase it? 
A: You know, I wouldn't rate US influence in the United 
Nations; I don't feel competent to do that yet. How will 
~ go about trying to increase US influence? Oh, by 
trying hard to listen carefully and find common ground, 
emphasize common interests, develop good relations with 
people. 
Q: At your first press conference you said you had done a 
study of public opinion ... 
A: I've been studying public opinion for years and years. 
Q: What's your reading of what the American public wants of 
its UN Ambassador? 
A: I don't think that's clear from the public opinion polls. 
.Q: 
If I look not at the public polls so much as at the 
letters that I've received from lots and lots of people 
since my appointment, I judge that what they would like 
is. civilized defense of American interests within the 
context of generally respectable behavior. I think they 
want me to behave in ways that will be acceptable to 
other people, but also to defend American interests, to 
speak up, to have confidence myself, respect for our 
traditions and our institutions. 
You emphasize the notion "civilized." What does that 
connote to you? 
A: I think an uncivilized conception of the US national 
interest would be one which took no account of anybody 
else and which took no account of moral principles. A 
civilized conception takes account of other people as 
well as ourselves and also takes account of our moral 
commitments. 
Q: You've also mentioned a survey that shows that support 
for the UN among the American public is not as strong 
among the foreign policy elites as it is at the base. 
Why do you think that is? 
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A: Oh, because I think that there's a residue in the • 
American public of great hopefulness about an institution 
like the united Nations. There's a strong streak of 
idealism in the American public, and the idea of a con-
vention of nations in which problems can be resolved by 
reason and discussion rather than by force and violence 
is enormously attractive to the American people. I think 
the residue of that optimism remains. The public is less 
well informed, of course, than the foreign policy elites. 
The foreign policy elites were probably reflecting more 
dissatisfaction with specific outcomes in recent years 
rather than reacting to a more generalized optimism and 
hope. 
Q: Such as actions against Israel? 
A: No ... you know, against freedom of information and that 
kind of thing. 
Q: You've been reluctant to accept the term "third world" as 
a meaningful description of a political grouping of 
nations. Yet the US rather consistently comes up against 
a rather impressively solid voting bloc of third world 
nations at the UN. Do you think that that bloc is not 
politically meaningful? 
A: Well, insofar as it is a bloc that functions politically, 
it's politically meaningful. 
Q: But you don't find it useful to describe it as the "third 
world"? 
A: Weil, I haven't yet. Maybe I'll learn some things at the 
United Nations to cause me to change my mind. 
Q: In your article Dictatorships and Double Standards [Com-
mentary, November 1979] you said that no problem of US 
foreign policy is more urgent than that of formulating a 
morally and strategically acceptable program for dealing 
with nondemocractic governments threatened by soviet-
sponsored subversion. 
A: Right. 
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Q: Can support for repressive regimes ever be morally accept-
able to the American public? 
A: Support? Yes, I think so. Under conditions of lesser 
evil. I think a great deal of policy is made, by the 
way, 
evil. 
World 
in terms not of the greater good, but the lesser 
And just as alliance with the Soviet union in 
War U could be a morally acceptable posture expe-
dient for fighting Nazism, so I think that support of 
regimes a good deal less repressive than the Soviet union 
can be a morally acceptable expedient for meeting certain 
other kinds of greater evils. 
Q: You have been critical of US policy in the past on this 
score ... 
A: I was critical of the Carter Administration precisely 
because I don't think they took account of the question 
of lesser evils, degrees of evils. I don't think it ever 
occurred to the Carter Administration, for example, that 
by participating actively in the departure of the Shah 
they might be in fact laying groundwork for a more repres-
sive government, which I think happened. 
Q: SO you're not talking about moral absolutes then? 
A: Oh no. I should say not. We're talking about a question 
of relative evils, relative goods. 
Q: The Reagan Administration has spoken out forcefully 
against international terrorism, yet it just lifted a ban 
on military co-operation with Chile. That ban was laid 
down as a result of the US finding that the Chilean 
Government had been implicated in a terrorist action 
resul ting in the death of an American citizen on the 
streets of Washington. Is that a double standard? 
A: I should say not. I mean, you know, that happened quite 
some time ago. And there' ve been very substantial im-
provements in Chile since then. And furthermore, I do 
not believe that the moral quality of a regime can be the 
only question which we weigh in the balance in deciding 
our relations with it. You know, we maintain relations 
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wi th a good many regimes in Africa, let's say, whose 
practices are not those that I would approve of or, I 
suppose, you would approve of. 
In addition to which, one moves on. Nations move 
on. People move on. I don't think that the fact that 
the Chilean Government was probably involved in a violent 
crime in Washington should be the basis for an eternally 
negative relationship between the united states and 
Chile. We know a great deal about soviet crimes in the 
united states or Cuban crimes in the united states, and I 
deplore those, and I think we ought to oppose them just 
as strenuously as we can. But I do not believe that the 
fact that such things have occurred ought to be the 
grounds on which we make all other decisions about rela-
tionships with the soviet Union, or whether we enter SALT 
negotiations or whether we go to a summit. 
Q: Our military support to EI Salvador, coupled with other 
statements the Administration has made, has drawn criti-
cism from some of our allies that we are tending to side 
with right-wing governments. Is that an unfair criticism? 
A: I think it's probably true that we would side with right-
wing governments as against left-wing governments, where 
the left-wing governments were associated, were inte-
grated into the Soviet bloc. I think that ought to be 
clear. Do we in principle like right-wing autocracies? 
I don't suppose we like any kind of autocracies. I 
suppose we'd like all governments to be democratic. As 
far as the criticism by our allies is concerned, I think 
that what we have are allies with limited alliances. We 
don't approve of all the actions of our allies; they 
don't approve all the actions of ours. 
Q: In your writings you seem to place a strong emphasis on 
communist subversion as a destabilizing factor in third 
world countries ... 
A: No I don't either. That's not true. That's ::lot gener-
ally true. I write about France and I don't place an 
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emphasis on Communist subversion. I wrote about Iran and 
I didn't place an emphasis on communist subversion. I 
wrote about Central America and I did, but it was a 
specific area. Let's be clear. Specific cases. I don't 
have a conception of the political world such that I sort 
of see Communist subversion in all parts of the world at 
all times. I'd like to be clear about that. 
Q: What I was getting at was the degree to which economic 
privation and political repression, internal factors in 
other words, are as much a part of the problem ... 
A: What problem? 
Q: The problem of instability, staying within the context of 
EI Salvador, for example ... 
A: You know, that's a very fashionable contemporary error, 
in my opinion. Economic privation exists in India, 
economic privation exists in Uganda, it exists in most of 
the world. You can't explain specific events like a 
specific insurgency in EI Salvador by reference to a 
condition which has existed for centuries or that exists 
in two-thirds of the world. If you want to explain that 
insurgency, then you have to begin with that insurgency, 
not with the condition that antedated it by a century or 
that exists all around it. 
Economic privation is an ill in itself; it's a bad 
thing. It causes people to suffer. Political revolution 
is something that takes place sometimes in some places, 
and it is carried ou~ by revolutionaries. And, by the 
way, that's who's doing it in EI Salvador. And if priva-
tion were the causal factor fueling insurgency in EI 
Salvador, the FDR [Revolutionary Democratic Front] would 
be in power today because most of the people in EI 
Salvador are miserably poor and most of them don't 
support the junta. And the proof of that is that Frente 
[the Front] in its final offensive got no support, no 
popular support. They understand that even themselves. 
It shouldn't be so hard for us to understand it. 
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Q: You've said emphatically that the situation in EI 
Salvador does not risk leading the US into another 
Vietnam. 
A: I have. 
Q: Specifically, in what ways are the two cases different? 
A: I think a more interesting question is why anybody would 
think it does, and I think I know the answer. I think 
that there are a good many people who are so appalled and 
intimidated personally by the use of power of any kind, 
that they think that any use of power will lead to the 
most dreadful things. 
Now there are lots of reasons that it's totally 
unanalogous; the most important one is geographic, actu-
ally. EI Salvador is very near us, and vietnam was a 
long way away. That's not the most important reason; 
that's the second most important reason. The most impor-
tant reason is that now we've had the experience in 
Vietnam. [American philosopher] Morris R. Cohen always 
said that the biggest difference between human beings and 
other objects of study, like sugar cubes or something, 
was that human beings change as a consequence of being 
studied. We changed as a consequence of having had the 
experience of Vietnam, and we're not going to make those 
particular kinds of mistakes again. 
There were, I think, some identifiable mistakes that 
could happen only once, because we hadn't done it before. 
We're going to be much'more deliberate, much more self-
conscious about those pitfalls. And when you add that to 
geographical proximity and limited objectives, and dif-
ferent terrain and different kinds of surrounding 
countries, differences in power and differences in the 
supply routes by which the rebels are supplied, it's just 
a different sense, that's all. 
Q: Senator Moynihan recently wrote a critique of the Carter 
Administration's UN policy, saying in effect that it 
placed undue emphasis on North-South relations, was 
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unnecessarily apologetic about the US role in the world 
and rolled over and played dead in the face of resolu-
tions unfairly critical of the US and of Israel. Do you 
disagree with that? 
A: No. I agree with that. 
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